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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-RIGHT TO TIAL BY JuRY IN JUVENILE DELIN-
QUENCY PROCEEDINGS-The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held
that the right to trial by jury in a juvenile proceeding is not so "fun-
damental" as to be constitutionally required.
Terry Appeal, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
Terry, a minor, was found delinquent in a non-jury hearing held in
the Juvenile Court of Philadelphia. On appeal, Terry argued that the
constitution as interpreted by In Re Gault1 and Duncan v. Louisiana2
accorded him the right to a jury trial. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in affirming the order of the lower court and ruling against Terry
arrived at its decision by a contrary interpretation of Gault and Dun-
can. The court stated that although the Gault Court used broad and
sweeping language, the holding was narrow. The court reasoned that
in light of this narrow holding it was difficult to conclude that juvenile
courts must comply with all the requirements of due process. It was
the court's task to decide whether or not the right to trial by jury was
one of the due process rights required in a juvenile proceeding.3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected Terry's contention that
Duncan v. Louisiana was useful in determining what due process rights
were applicable in juvenile courts. In Duncan the Supreme Court held
that "(t)he fourteenth amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in
all criminal cases which-were they to be tried in a federal court-
would come within the sixth amendment's guarantee.... ." Although
the Court in Duncan again spoke in sweeping terms, Pennsylvania
maintains there is also language contained in the Duncan opinion that
restricts the absolutism of its holding and indicates the ruling may not
necessarily be controlling in juvenile proceedings. To resolve the ques-
tion the court pointed out that they must determine "(w)hether there
are elements in the juvenile process which render the right to a trial
by jury less essential to the protection of an accused's rights in the ju-
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
3. Terry Appeal, 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
4. 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
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venile system than in the normal criminal process, and therefore not
so 'fundamental' as to be constitutionally required."5
The court enumerated four factors which they felt, when coupled
with the constitutional protections of Gault, were elements in the ju-
venile process which render the right to a jury trial non-essential in a
juvenile proceeding. They concluded because of the safeguards built
into the juvenile system Duncan does not apply to juveniles and Penn-
sylvania is not constitutionally compelled to grant the right to trial
by jury.
In Terry the court first emphasizes that the sweeping rationale of
Gault was greatly tempered by its narrow holding. "If we had only the
broader language it would be difficult to resist the conclusion that the
Supreme Court had concluded that juvenile courts must comply with
all the requirements of due process. The holdings do not, however,
seem to contemplate so large a result ....7 It is submitted the narrow
holding in Gault should not be used to conclude the Court intended
to restrict its sweeping rationale. The Supreme Court in Gault clearly
states:
In their jurisdictional statement and brief in this court, appellants
do not urge upon us all of the points passed upon by the Supreme
Court of Arizona. They urge that we hold the juvenile code of
Arizona invalid on its face or as applied in this case because, con-
trary to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the juvenile is taken from the custody of his parents and com-
mitted to a state institution. . and in which the following basic
rights are denied:
1. Notice of the charges;
2. Right to counsel;
3. Right to confrontation and cross-examination;
4. Privilege against self-incrimination;
5. Right to a transcript of the proceedings; and
6. Right to appellate review.
We shall not consider other issues which were passed upon by the
Supreme Court of Arizona. We emphasize that we indicate no
opinion as to whether the decision of that court with respect to
such other issues does or does not conflict with requirements of
the Federal Constitution.8
5. Terry Appeal, 438 Pa. 339, 348, 265 A.2d 350, 354 (1970).
6. id.
7. Id. at 345, 265 A.2d at 353.
8. In Re Gault, 387 US. 1, 10-11 (1967).
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One of the issues passed upon by the Supreme Court of Arizona was
"(t)hat the correct burden of proof is that 'the juvenile judge must be
persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that the infant has com-
mitted the alleged delinquent act'." 9 The United States Supreme Court
failed to mention the burden of proof standard in the Gault decision;
yet three years later when confronted with the same question in In Re
Winship10 the Supreme Court decided if a juvenile's due process rights
were not to be denied, the correct standard of proof required in a ju-
venile proceeding is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.11 Winship is a
strong affirmation of the Supreme Court's statement in Gault that they
would only rule on the points brought before them by the appellants,
and the lack of review of other issues ruled upon by the Arizona Su-
preme Court was not to be construed as an indication of the Court's
opinion concerning the constitutionality of these issues.' 2 Therefore
to interpret, as the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did in Terry, the
narrow holding in Gault as being carefully tailored and designed by
the Supreme Court to temper its sweeping rationale places on that
decision an unwarranted restriction and one not borne out in light of
the Court's recent ruling in Winship.
Pennsylvania next contends that the Duncan decision also contains
restrictive language which indicates the right to trial by jury is not an
absolute constitutional requirement nor necessarily fundamental in
every type of proceeding.'3 The majority seemingly justifies this con-
tention by quoting from footnote 14 of the Duncan case: "(i)t might
be said that the limitation in question is not necessarily fundamental to
fairness in every criminal system that might be imagined but is fun-
damental in the context of the criminal processes maintained by the
American states."'14 "A criminal process which was fair and equitable
but used no juries is easy to imagine. It would make use of alternative
guarantees and protections which would serve the purposes that the
jury serves in the English and American system."' 5 Pennsylvania alleges
this language contained in footnote 14 of the Duncan decision indicates
there is a definite restriction on the absolutism of the holding. How-
9. Id. at 11 n. 7.
10. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
11. Id.
12. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
13. 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
14. 391 U.S. 145, 150 n. 14 (1968).
15. Id.
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ever, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quoted only a portion of that
footnote. The United States Supreme Court went on to state:
. . . (Y)et no American state has undertaken to construct such a
system. Instead, every American state, including Louisiana, uses
the jury extensively, and imposes very serious punishments only
after a trial at which the defendant has a right to a jury's verdict.
In every state, including Louisiana, the structure and style of the
criminal process-the supporting framework and the subsidiary
procedures-are of the sort that naturally complement jury trial,
and have developed in connection with and in reliance upon jury
trial.'0
Justice Cohen in his dissenting opinion in Terry asserts that footnote
14 in Duncan does not place a restriction on that decision and, if any-
thing, amplifies the need for a jury by emphasizing its role in American
jurisprudence."7 The most cogent argument against accepting footnote
14 as a restriction can be derived from the absolutism of the language
contained in Justice White's majority opinion in Duncan and Justice
Fortas' concurring opinion in Bloom v. Illinois.'8 Justice White states:
"Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental
to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were
they to be tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee."' 9 (Note: A three-judge district court, several
months before Duncan was decided, in Nieves v. United States, de-
clared 18 U.S.C.A. § 5033 unconstitutional. § 5033 holds that a juvenile
to be tried under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act must first waive
his right to a jury trial. In ruling § 5033 unconstitutional the three-
judge panel also held that in light of Gault, juveniles were entitled to
trial by jury in all federal juvenile proceedings.) 20 In his concurring
opinion in Bloom, Justice Fortas writes: "I believe as my Brother
White's opinion for the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana persuasively
argues, that the right to jury trial in major prosecutions, states as well
as federal, is so fundamental to the protection of justice and liberty
that 'due process of law' cannot be accorded without it.121 Justice Doug-
las' dissenting opinion in DeBacker v. Brainard22 also failed to note
16. Id.
17. 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
18. 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
19. 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
20. 280 F. Supp. 994 (1968).
21. 391 U.S. 194, 212 (1968).
22. 396 U.S. 28 (1970).
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any restrictions on the absolutism of Duncan. In the DeBacker decision
the majority of the Court decided not to rule on the right to trial by
jury for juveniles as Duncan v. Louisiana applied only prospectively
and DeBacker's hearing was conducted before the Duncan decision.
Justice Douglas in delivering the dissenting opinion stipulates: "I
would reach the merits and hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require a jury trial as a matter of right .... ,,23 "(G)iven the
fundamental nature of the right to jury trial as expressed in Duncan
and Bloom, there is, as I see it, no constitutionally sufficient reason to
deprive the juvenile of this right."24 It is concluded that the Pennsyl-
vania Supreme Court, by its reading of and reliance on footnote 14, in
the Duncan case interpreted in that decision a restriction that was not
intended.
Pennsylvania finally enumerates the following four elements which
are factors built into the juvenile system:
(1) The judges in juvenile courts take a different view of their
role than that taken by judges in criminal courts;
(2) The juvenile system utilizes various diagnostic and rehabilita-
tive services and is thus better capable of providing under-
standing and sympathetic treatment;
(3) An adjudication of delinquency is much less onerous than a
finding of guilty in a criminal trial; and
(4) The right to trial by jury, if incorporated as one of the due
process rights a juvenile is entitled to, would disrupt the
unique nature of the juvenile process.
These factors, Pennsylvania asserts, together with the constitutional
due process safeguards of Gault provide the juvenile system with the
"alternative guarantees and protections" required to render a jury trial
non-essential as a "fundamental" constitutional right within the mean-
ing of Duncan.25
The Gault Court in commenting on the juvenile judge's role indi-
cates this role is probably not as helpful to the juvenile system as an
orderly appearance of due process.
The early conception of the Juvenile Court proceeding was one
in which a fatherly judge touched the heart and conscience of the
erring youth .... Then, as now, good will and compassion were
admirably prevalent. But recent studies have, with surprising
23. DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 US. 28, 35 (1970).
24. Id. at 88.
25. 438 Pa. 39, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
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unanimity, entered sharp dissent as to the validity of this gentle
conception. They suggest that the appearance as well as the actu-
ality of fairness, impartiality and orderliness-in short, the es-
sentials of due process--may be a more impressive and more
therapeutic attitude so far as the juvenile is concerned.20
Gault then clearly specifies that while the juvenile judge's differing
role can be retained it is not a substitute for the orderliness of due
process.
Pennsylvania next proposes that because the juvenile system uses
various diagnostic and rehabilitative services they are better equipped
to provide understanding and sympathetic treatment. The juvenile
courts are provided "(w)ith services specially designed to aid mi-
nors. ... "27 The Supreme Court in Gault also recognizes the value of
these services in a juvenile system, and feels they should be preserved
as part of the juvenile process. However, they carefully point out that
these services have no effect on the adjudicatory phase of the juvenile
proceedings where the juvenile is provided with the protections of the
Due Process Clause. "The problems of pre-adjudication treatment of
juveniles, and of post-adjudication disposition, are unique to the juve-
nile process; hence what we hold in this opinion with regard to the pro-
cedural requirements at the adjudicatory stage has no necessary ap-
plicability to other steps of the juvenile process. '' 28 The Court reiterates
this view in Winship when they reject the New York Court of Appeals'
argument that since juvenile proceedings are designed to aid the child
and not punish him they should not be subject to the due process right
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In repudiating this argument the
Court states: "Again, however, Gault expressly rejected this justi-
fication. We made clear in that decision that civil labels and good in-
tentions do not themselves obviate the need for criminal due process
safeguards in juvenile courts .... ,29 Therefore, while the Supreme
Court willingly admits the juvenile system can provide the child with
unique services, they specifically reject Pennsylvania's argument that
this is a factor for denying the child's due process rights during the
adjudication phase of the juvenile process.
The third element Pennsylvania contends is a factor which renders
26. 387 U.S. 1, 25-6 (1967).
27. 438 Pa. 339, 348, 265 A.2d 350, 355 (1970).
28. 387 US. 1, 31 n. 48 (1967).
29. 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970).
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trial by jury less essential to juveniles is that an adjudication of delin-
quency is less onerous than a finding of guilty in a criminal trial. "None
of the disabilities which follow a criminal conviction attach to an ad-
judicated delinquent, and most importantly, the institutions to which
juveniles are committed are something less than jails, for there is a
greater emphasis on rehabilitation."80 The first time the United States
Supreme Court questioned this "civil" in nature distinction as a reason
for the deprivation of a juvenile's constitutional rights was in Kent.
There the Court observed, "[w]hile there can be no doubt of the orig-
inal laudable purpose of juvenile courts, studies and critiques in recent
years raise serious questions as to whether actual performance measures
well enough against theoretical purpose to make tolerable the immu-
nity of the process from the reach of constitutional guarantees applica-
ble to adults. 31 In Gault the Court again considered the importance of
the classification of "delinquent" as opposed to "criminal." They note,
"[t]here is, of course, no reason why this should not continue. It is dis-
concerting, however, that this term has come to involve only slightly
less stigma than the term 'criminal' applied to adults."32 In further
discussion concerning the juvenile's loss of constitutional rights based
on the premise a finding of delinquency does not lead to criminal in-
volvement the Gault Court observes, "[i]n the first place, juvenile pro-
ceeding to determine 'delinquency', which may lead to commitment to
a state institution, must be regarded as 'criminal' . . . . To hold other-
wise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble enticement
of the 'civil' label-of-convenience which has been attached to juvenile
proceedings."' - Disregarding this language the New York Court of
Appeals in Winship, made substantially the same "less onerous" argu-
ment that Pennsylvania makes in Terry. They contend that the due
process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt need not be
incorporated in a juvenile proceeding because a delinquency status is
not a crime; and the proceedings are not criminal. In reaffirming their
stand in Gault the Supreme Court again rejects this argument: "In
effect the Court of Appeals distinguished the proceedings in question
here from a criminal prosecution by use of what Gault called the 'civil'
label of convenience .... But Gault expressly rejected that designa-
tion as a reason for holding the Due Process Clause inapplicable to a
30. 438 Pa. 339, 349, 265 A.2d 350, 355 (1970).
31. Kent v. U.S., 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966).
32. 387 U.S. 1, 23-4 (1967).
33. Id. at 49-50.
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juvenile proceeding."84 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania empha-
sizes, a factor to be considered when determining a juvenile's consti-
tutional rights is that commitment following a juvenile hearing will
place the child in an institution where the focus is on rehabilitation.
Again Gault excludes this as a factor in determining constitutional
rights. "It is of no constitutional consequence-and of limited practical
meaning-that the institution to which he is committed is called an
Industrial School. The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic
the title, a 'receiving home' or an 'industrial school' for juveniles is an
institution of confinement in which the child is incarcerated for a
greater or lesser time."33
Therefore, it is submitted that the first three of the four elements
Pennsylvania classifies as important considerations in resolving whether
a juvenile's right to trial by jury is constitutionally required have been
specifically rejected by the Supreme Court in Kent, Gault and Winship
as factors to be considered when determining a child's constitutional
rights in a juvenile proceeding.
When enumerating the four elements, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court postulated that these elements coupled with the due process
safeguards of Gault are factors in the juvenile system which rendered
the right to trial by jury constitutionally non-essential. However, the
fourth factor is not an inherent element of the juvenile process. It
merely states that jury trials for juveniles, of all the due process rights,
would be most disruptive to the juvenile system.3 6 This certainly cannot
be considered as an element that provides the juvenile with additional
safeguards which, when coupled with the due process guarantees of
Gault, would render the right to trial by jury constitutionally non-
essential. True, the present juvenile system might be disrupted to
some extent by jury hearings, but should administrative difficulties be
a consideration when determining constitutional rights? If Duncan
does apply equally to juveniles as it does to adults, is the juvenile's
constitutional right to be revoked because he is a child? The Court in
Gault states: "Under our constitution, the condition of being a boy
does not justify a kangaroo court."37 It must be remembered that Dun-
can did not require a jury trial in all criminal proceedings, but only in
serious crimes.38 (Note: Duncan did not draw an exact line between
34. 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970).
35. 387 U.S. 1, 27 (1967).
36. 438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 (1970).
37. 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967).
38. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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serious crimes and petty offenses but they did stipulate incarceration
for two or more years constituted a serious crime. Statistics from the
Warrendale Youth Development Center and the New Castle Youth
Development Center, Pennsylvania, reveal the average length of com-
mitment to be eight months at New Castle YDC and 13 months at
Warrendale YDC.) Presently, then, a juvenile's right to a jury trial
would only extend to serious crimes as defined in Duncan v. Louisiana,
and therefore the juvenile process would be disrupted only to the same
extent.
The majority in Terry construes Gault and Duncan in a narrow and
restricted manner. Yet close scrutiny does not verify such a narrow
interpretation. The majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
further rationalizes its unwillingness to apply Duncan's holding to
juveniles by enumerating four elements which, they state, when coupled
with the due process guarantees of Gault render the right to trial by
jury constitutionally non-essential in a juvenile hearing. However, as
indicated, these four elements were specifically rejected by the United
States Supreme Court as factors to be considered when determining a
juvenile's constitutional rights. Therefore, in conclusion, it is submitted
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in holding that juveniles are not
constitutionally entitled to a jury trial do so without adequately justi-
fying that decision.
Dennis L. Veraldi
CONsTTrUONAL LAW-BURDEN OF PROOF IN A JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDING-The Supreme Court of the United States has held that
where a juvenile is charged with the commission of a delinquent
offense for which institutional confinement may be imposed, due
process requires that the charges against him be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
During a 1967 adjudicatory hearing, the appellant, a 12-year-old boy,
was adjudicated a "delinquent." The act upon which the adjudication
was based would have constituted larceny had the appellant been an
adult. The presiding judge, relying on a statute,' found that by the
1. N.Y. FAMILY COURT Acr § 744(b) (McKinney Supp. 1970) provides in part: "Any
determination at the conclusion of a fact-finding hearing that a respondent did an act
or acts must be based on a preponderance of the evidence."
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